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This paper outlines a real options approach to valuing those an-
nouncements which are made by ¯rms outside their legal requirements.
From the ¯rm's perspective, information is disclosed only if the man-
ager of the ¯rm is su±ciently certain that the market response to the
announcement will have a positive impact on the value of the ¯rm.
When debt ¯nancing is possible it is found that the manager adopts a
more transparent disclosure policy, thus violating the Modigliani{Miller
theorem on irrelevance of capital structure on ¯rm value.
Keywords: Voluntary Disclosure, Real Options, Modigliani{Miller The-
orem.
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1 Introduction
Corporate voluntary disclosure has become an important element of capital
market dynamics (Wen [22]) in that it conveys value-relevant information for
market pricing. As well as this, it typically contains information related to a
¯rm's activities which may not be immediately stated in accounting reports.
The issue has become increasingly topical and important in the aftermath of
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1some major corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom and others. Such
events have raised concerns over the transparency of U.S. ¯rms and, in particu-
lar, the quality of their ¯nancial reporting and disclosures (Dempster [5]). This
paper demonstrates how a real options approach to valuation can contribute
to our understanding of corporate disclosure, and in particular, voluntary cor-
porate disclosure which is concerned with those announcements willingly made
by ¯rms which are outside their legal and regulatory requirements.
One of the earliest ¯ndings in the disclosure literature, provided by Gross-
man and Hart [12] and Grossman [11], has become known as the \unravelling
result". If the managers of ¯rms, holding private information, choose not to
disclose their information to outside investors, then the investors will discount
the value of the ¯rm down to the lowest possible value consistent with whatever
voluntary disclosure is made. Once the managers realise this, they will have
an incentive to make full disclosure. Dye [8], however, challenges this result,
and provides a reasoning for why it may not always hold. He shows that the
qualitative features of an optimal disclosure policy for management may take
the form of a policy dependent cuto® in which management disclose only if
the information is su±ciently good, otherwise they withhold disclosure. His
reasoning is due to the uncertainty of investors about the ¯rm's information
endowment; that is, investors may not be able to distinguish between managers
holding undisclosed information from managers being uninformed. In such a
setting, investors seeing non-disclosure must temper their inferences concern-
ing the likelihood of a manager having observed bad news and opting not to
disclose by the fact that non-disclosure may have arisen due to managers be-
ing uninformed. Since these early seminal contributions by Grossman [11] and
Dye [8], a large body of work has emerged on corporate voluntary disclosure.
Verrecchia [21] provides an extensive survey on such disclosure models.
One interpretation of voluntary announcements is that they provide an op-
portunity for managers to communicate to the marketplace that they are aware
of, and up to date with, current investor demands and interests. For example,
Subramani and Walden [17], in their study of the market impact of e-commerce
announcements, argue that the reason for the signi¯cant positive abnormal re-
turns that they found were in part because investors viewed announcement of
such initiatives as favourable signals of certain ¯rm attributes. Furthermore,
Graham et al. [10] argue that companies voluntarily disclose information to
provide clarity to (potential) investors.
The role of disclosure has been recently investigated in the ¯nance liter-
ature, which considers how a ¯rm's disclosure policy may a®ect competition
and/or highlight or amplify ¯nancial market ine±ciencies (see Admati and
P°eiderer [1]). Their research shows that a ¯rm's market value can be driven
by investors' hopes and fears about, for example, growth opportunities as much
as by any fundamental analysis. Thus, announcements may a®ect market per-
ceptions about expected future earnings and risk.
2Importantly, across various streams of research investigating corporate dis-
closure, there is a growing recognition that the various announcements that
¯rms make have an inherent strategic value in their power to in°uence external
perceptions directly and ¯rm performance indirectly (see Bettis [3]).
In principle, a ¯rm can make an announcement about anything it chooses,
and thus, the range of announcement applications is endless. Examples of such
announcements include competitive pricing strategies, new product introduc-
tions, various mergers, acquisitions and other alliances, and a range of detailed
structural changes within the ¯rm. However, in practice, ¯rms tend to make
announcements only about key strategic and organisational events that could
impact substantially on their value and success (see Bayus et al. [2]).
In this paper we view voluntary disclosure of information relating to the
state of the ¯rm to the marketplace as a (real) option held by the the ¯rm's
manager. Exercising the option to disclose information is a strategic decision
on the part of the ¯rm, which implies that the manager will only do so if
he is su±ciently certain that the payo®s are positive, i.e. that the option
is deep enough in the money. In this paper we measure the payo® to the
disclosure option by the impact of market response to the information on the
value of the ¯rm. This re°ects the standard corporate practise to (partly)
remunerate managers based on the ¯rm's stock market performance. This,
e®ectively, aligns the manager's incentives with potential sellers of the ¯rm's
equity. They, after all, are interested in ¯rm value to be as high as possible.
We also adapt the model show to that it provides an example of a violation
to the Modigliani{Miller theorem on irrelevance of ¯nancial structure on ¯rm
value. When, namely, some of the disclosure cost is ¯nanced with debt, the
limited liability aspect of debt dominates the loss to the ¯rm from compen-
sating the lender for expected default losses, and consequently, the optimal
disclosure threshold for the manager is lower. As such this is an interesting ex-
ample where excess risk taking by managers due to limited liability protection
of debt ¯nancing actually has a positive e®ect.
From a modelling point of view our paper is most closely related to Thijssen
et al. [20] and Sabarwal [14]. The model of the arrival of imperfect signals over
time follows that of Thijssen et al. [20]. That paper analyses the problem
of a ¯rm with the opportunity to invest in a project which has an uncertain
pro¯tability and, therefore, does not feature the debt ¯nancing issue that is
central to our paper. Sabarwal [14] shows how the ideas regarding the value of
the option to wait provide a violation of the Modigliani{Miller theorem, but he
deals with uncertainty using the standard framework of real options literature
(see Dixit and Pindyck [6]), whereas in our model, uncertainty is resolved over
time and thus, standard stochastic calculus tools cannot be used.
The paper is organised as follows; the benchmark model is described and
the optimal stopping problem for the disclosure threshold is solved in the
3next section. Section 3 discusses some of the important features inherent in
the manager's optimal disclosure policy. Section 4 analyses the model from
another dimension; namely if some of the disclosure cost is ¯nanced with debt,
and Section 5 ¯nally concludes. All proofs appear in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a ¯rm that has invested in a new project and that receives private in-
formation over time pertaining to the project's performance (like, for example,
sales ¯gures). We assume that the ¯rm's management is not legally obliged
to disclose this information. Thus, the manager can exercise discretion over
whether to share his private information with the market or to withhold it.
His objective is to adopt a disclosure policy such that his own current expected
(discounted) utility from wealth is maximised.
It is assumed that the manager of the ¯rm is uncertain about how the
private information he holds will be perceived by the market. This source of
uncertainty di®ers with Dye [8] in the sense that he assumes the uncertainty
arises because the market is unsure what, if any, information the manager has
obtained. Indeed, in the current set-up, this assumption of response uncer-
tainty is necessary to prevent (extremely) high returns from being disclosed,
an act that would initiate the unravelling process described by Grossman and
Hart [12].
If the information is regarded positively by the market, we assume this will
result in a change in the (present) value of the ¯rm of V P > 0 or, if regarded
negatively, a change of V N < 0. There are several reasons why such response
uncertainty may arise. Firstly, a ¯rm's manager has imperfect information
about a shareholder's prior expectations, in which case the ¯rm does not know
whether the response to disclosure will be favourable or unfavourable. Sec-
ondly, the market can interpret the disclosed information in di®erent ways. In
Dutta and Trueman [7], response uncertainty arises because ¯rms do not know
how investors will interpret the ¯rm's private information. They present the
disclosure of order backlog as an example. Investors can interpret a high-order
backlog favourably if they believe that it signals high demand for the ¯rm's
product. Alternatively, they can interpret a high-order backlog unfavourably
if they believe that it signals problems with the ¯rm's production facilities or
a manager's lack of control over operations. Finally, as argued in Suijs [18], re-
sponse uncertainty can arise if investor response also depends on other factors
that are beyond the ¯rm's control, such as disclosure by competitors.
It is further assumed that all disclosures are (ex post) veri¯able; that is, a
manager will not issue misleading information in an attempt to alter the mar-
ket's perception of his ¯rm's prospects. Stocken [16] examines in detail the
4credibility of a manager's disclosure of privately observed nonveri¯able infor-
mation. His main ¯nding is that a manager will almost always endogenously
truthfully disclose his private information because if the market perceives lack
of credibility in the disclosure, it will ignore it and this can lead to deeper
problems for the ¯rm in the future. The credibility could also be interpreted
from the manager's reputation perspective. According to a study conducted
by Graham et al. [10], executives believe that a reputation for not consistently
providing precise and accurate information can lead to the under-pricing of
the ¯rm's stock.
In this model, disclosure is costly and the sunk cost involved in disclosing
the information signal(s) is denoted by I > 0, such that V N < 0 · I < V P.
For example, there may be some direct costs associated with producing and
disseminating information; that is, information may need to be disclosed or
certi¯ed by third parties such as accounting ¯rms. It is important to note that
these costs are direct and do not relate to the (indirect) proprietary costs that
are typically referred to in the disclosure literature such as the cost of revealing
¯rm sensitive information to competitors. There also exists an exogenous
opportunity cost of waiting for more, and possibly better, information signals
to arrive. By waiting for further signals, the manager can be more certain of
the overall value of the ¯rm, which will reduce the likelihood of misinforming
the market and thereby damaging his reputation. These costs of announcing
the information, and therefore exercising the disclosure option, could greatly
outweigh the bene¯t of disclosure.
We assume throughout that a fraction of the ¯rm is owned by the manager.
Therefore, the manager's compensation depends upon the ¯rm's activities, and
as such, he is compensated with a fraction of the option to disclose. Note that
if the manager's compensation does not depend on the disclosure option itself,
then in the absence of control, the manager should not have any preference for
the timing of disclosure. Assuming that the manager's preferences are quasi-
linear in his share in the ¯rm's value we can assume the manager to maximise
¯rm value.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the ¯rm has invested in a project and re-
ceives (private) information regarding the project's pro¯tability. The manager
has, at any time, the option to voluntarily disclose the information at a sunk
cost I ¸ 0. The manager is uncertain about market reaction to the disclo-
sure. The true state of the world can be either good (´ = 1) or bad (´ = 0)
resulting in a change in ¯rm value of V P > I or V N < 0, respectively. Over
time, the manager receives information, the arrival of which follow a Poisson
process with parameter ¹ > 0. Information is interpreted by the manager as
either increasing the likelihood of a positive market response or decreasing it.
Each batch of information, however, is an imperfect signal which re°ects the
true market reaction with probability µ 2 (1=2;1). In this set-up the number
of signals indicating a positive market reaction net of the number of signals
5indicating a negative market reaction is a su±cient statistic for the manager's
optimal disclosure policy. At time t this number of signals is denoted by st 2 Z.
Under the assumptions regarding the arrival and precision of information it





1 w.p. [1(´=1)µ + 1(´=0)(1 ¡ µ)]¹dt
0 w.p. 1 ¡ ¹dt
¡1 w.p. [1(´=1)(1 ¡ µ) + 1(´=0)µ]¹dt.
(1)
Suppose that the manager has a prior over the probability of a positive
market reaction equal to p0 2 (0;1). If, at time t ¸ 0, the manager observes
st, then the his posterior probability of a favourable market response follows
from an application of Bayes' rule (see Thijssen et al. [20]):
pt := p(st) =
µst
µst + ³(1 ¡ µ)st; (2)
where ³ = (1 ¡ p0)=p0 is the prior odds ratio. Note that p is a monotonically













This implies that we can either work with the number of net signals or the
posterior belief. In the following we use both approaches intermittently, de-
pending on analytical convenience.
If the manager discloses the information at time t ¸ 0, then, conditional
on the prior p0, the expected change in the ¯rm's value equals
U(st) := p(st)V
P + (1 ¡ p(st))V
N ¡ I: (4)
Assuming that the manager discounts future payo®s at a constant rate r > 0,










where Et denotes the expectation conditional on all information available up
to and including time t, and the supremum is taken over stopping times.
Problem (5) has an analytical solution, which takes the form of a threshold
policy: the manager should disclose the information as soon as the posterior
belief exceeds a certain threshold belief p¤. Adapting the arguments in Thijssen
et al. [20] to our setting this threshold can be shown to be given by (see
Appendix A for details)
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¯ + µ(1 ¡ µ) = 0: (7)
Note that there is no guarantee that there exists an integer s 2 Z such that
p¤ = p(s). In other words, the optimal disclosure threshold in terms of net
signals can be any real number. Since signals are integers this implies that the
manager should wait until the posterior probability, driven by (2) exceeds p¤.
In other words, the disclosure threshold in terms of net signals is s¤ = ds(p¤)e.1
3 Properties of the Optimal Disclosure Policy
This section provides an insight into the main features that emerge from the
manager's disclosure policy. The following proposition shows that the policy
under the current approach gives a more stringent criterion than the standard
NPV approach demands. This is a standard result from the real options liter-
ature (see, for example, Dixit and Pindyck [6]) and arises from the fact that
the traditional NPV approach does not incorporate the opportunity cost of
waiting for more informative signals by exercising the option immediately. Its
proof can be found in Appendix B.
Proposition 1. The real options approach leads to a well-de¯ned threshold
probability, p¤, and requires a more stringent criteria on the timing of disclo-
sure than the classical NPV approach would demand.
The result of a comparative static analysis of the threshold, p¤, with respect
to the model's key economic variables is given in the following proposition, the
proof of which is obtained through simple calculus and is, therefore, omitted.
Proposition 2. The threshold belief in a positive market response, p¤, in-
creases with I, and decreases with V P and V N.
The greater the impact an announcement will have on the positive value
of the ¯rm, that is, the higher V P, the lower the threshold belief in a positive
trading response needs to be before the manager exercises his option to disclose
the information. Hence, the ¯rm will announce its information to the market
earlier. This is consistent with Suijs [18] who ¯nds that a stronger positive
response makes disclosure a more attractive option, and therefore, the ¯rm
can be less certain about the market reaction being positive for disclosure to
be optimal.
Additionally, the lower the impact an announcement will have on a negative
trading response, that is, the higher V N, the earlier the ¯rm will disclose. This
1For s 2 R, ds(p¤)e := minfk 2 Z+jk ¸ sg.
7is again corroborated by Suijs [18] who points out that a stronger negative
response makes disclosure less attractive compared to nondisclosure, and thus,
the ¯rm must be more certain about being a good ¯rm for disclosure to be
optimal.
The greater the cost of making an announcement, the higher the threshold
belief in a positive response and the later the ¯rm will announce. This is
owing to the fact that if the (direct) costs of, say, preparing or disseminating
information are high, the manager requires more time to con¯rm the accuracy
of the information signals. By so doing, he obtains a stronger conviction about
how the market will react to the news and the likelihood of making a wrong
disclosure decision is reduced.
From Figures 1 and 2, we can see how p¤ and s¤, respectively, change with µ.
It is evident that the critical belief in a positive market response increases with
the quality of the information signal, and indeed, comparative static results
would support this. However, Figure 2 shows that the critical number of
positive over negative signals, s¤, decreases in µ. Hence, the more informative
the signal, the more attractive it is for the ¯rm to wait and demand a higher
certainty that disclosure will impact positively on the ¯rm value, through the
market response. However, this belief is reached after fewer signals have been
obtained, i.e. when there is a lower excess of positive over negative signals.
This result is explained by Sarkar [15]. When the quality of the signals are
high (low), there are likely to be large upward (downward) jumps in the belief
variable, p, and thus, the likelihood that the threshold, p¤, is attained after a
lower number of positive over negative signals are obtained increases.








Figure 1: Comparative statics for p¤
with respect to µ






Figure 2: Comparative statics for s¤
with respect to µ
Finally, we can say something about the frequency of information arriving
on the optimal disclosure policy. The proof of the proposition below can be
found in Appendix C.
8Proposition 3. As the expected time between signal arrivals increases, the
manager's optimal disclosure threshold decreases.
This proposition is consistent with Cosimano et al. [4] who ¯nd that over
time, investor uncertainty is heightened when no voluntary disclosures have
been made. Consequently, this increases the pressure for voluntary disclosure.
A plausible explanation for this is given by Einhorn and Ziv [9] who examine
corporate voluntary disclosures in a multi-period setting. They conclude that
inter-temporal dynamics occur because a ¯rm's use of their private information
is assumed to be history dependent.
Now consider the situation where the true state of the world is a positive
market response (´ = 1). Using equation (21) in Thijssen et al. [20], which
is the conditional ¯rst passage time density, we calculate the expected time
until disclosure takes place as a function of ¹. From Figure 3 it is clear that
the function is not continuous and that the expected time of disclosure is not
monotonic with respect to ¹. This is because the realisations of s are discrete.
Therefore, for certain values of ¹, the threshold jumps from ds¤e to ds¤e + 1.
Since, from Proposition 3, p¤ increases with ¹, so too does s¤. If, as a result,
ds¤e increases with unity, one additional good signal (over the number of bad
signals) is required before it is optimal to disclose the information. This implies
that the expected time before disclosure jumps upwards. Immediately after
the jump, the expected time decreases continuously with ¹ until the threshold
jumps again.












Figure 3: Comparative statics of expected time of disclosure given a positive
response for ¹ with µ = 0:6 ¯xed.
94 Debt and Voluntary Disclosure
In this section, we consider how the manager's disclosure policy is a®ected
when some of the sunk costs associated with disclosure are ¯nanced with debt.
As in Section 2, it is assumed that the manager is compensated via stock
options and that he is given complete discretion about the disclosure policy he
adopts.
Typically, it may not be realistic to assume that some of the disclosure costs
are ¯nanced with debt since the relative magnitude of such costs are usually
too small to warrant such an assumption. However, the disclosure aspect of
whether to reveal the news about the project is still a contributor to the overall
project's pro¯tability through V P, V N, and I, and thus disclosure is simply an
option problem within a bigger option problem which is beyond the scope of
this section. If there is an injection of debt which generally funds the project's
sunk costs, some of which are obviously made up of the sunk disclosure costs,
then in that sense, debt is, at least partially, funding the disclosure. The idea
for the coupon rate is similar; that is, part of the payo® from disclosure, if
impact is V P, is used to repay the debt via the coupon payment and if impact
is V N then none of the disclosure payo® goes toward the debt obligation.
The main reason for the association between debt and disclosure relates to
the manager-lender con°ict. Without debt, in an all equity ¯rm, the manager
incurs both upside and downside risk from making a disclosure. However, with
debt, the manager's downside risk is limited, in that some of the sunk costs
of disclosure are covered, and the lender is assumed to have ¯rst claim on
revenues obtained from disclosure up to a ¯xed coupon, C, which the lender
determines. This may provide the manager with ex post incentives to make
decisions that are not in the lender's best interest. For example, the manager
may opt to disclose some negative information about the prospects of the ¯rm
if he wishes to discourage other players from entering the market. Recognising
this possibility, the lender demands a higher interest rate on the loan which
implies a higher coupon payment.
The manager's objective is still to maximise his (discounted) expected util-
ity from wealth, which is equivalent to maximising ¯rm value owing to the
compensation assumption, and the lender adopts a zero pro¯t condition. The
disclosure problem is then to determine an equilibrium belief level, p¤¤
d , such
that, simultaneously, the manager's and the lender's objectives are satis¯ed,
for a given level of debt. We also show how the disclosure policy changes as
the debt level changes.
104.1 Manager's Problem
The manager gains when the ¯rm's payo® from disclosure exceeds its debt
obligation, and su®ers a loss otherwise. However, he su®ers far less damage if
his payo® falls just short, or way short, of the debt obligation, than if all of
the disclosure cost was ¯nanced with equity.
Denote by 0 < D · I the ¯rm's only debt payment. It is assumed that
if the response to disclosure is negative, and consequently, the impact on ¯rm
value is V N, the ¯rm defaults on its loan; that is, V N ¡ (I ¡ D) < 0. In the
event of a default, the payment to the lender is 0 and the manager su®ers by
the amount V N ¡ (I ¡ D) > V N ¡ I. On the other hand, if the response is
positive, the impact on ¯rm value is V P and it is assumed that the manager
can meet his debt obligation. This implies that V P ¡(I ¡D)¡C ¸ 0 and the
lender is paid C while the manager retains the residual V P ¡ I + D ¸ 0.




P ¡ I + D ¡ C) + (1 ¡ p(st))(V
N ¡ (I ¡ D))
=p(st)(V
P ¡ C) + (1 ¡ p(st))V
N ¡ (I ¡ D);
(8)
where p(st) is given by equation (2).
Solving for the optimal threshold, via an optimal stopping approach (see Sec-
tion 2 and Appendix A) yields the optimal threshold, when some of the cost


















which is a well-de¯ned probability, if, and only if, (I ¡D) · (V P ¡C), which
is satis¯ed.
4.2 Lender's Problem
In this subsection, we outline the problem from the lender's perspective. Simi-
lar to Sabarwal [14], we assume that the lender adopts a zero pro¯t condition.




t = pltC ¡ D: (10)
Note that plt denotes the lender's belief, at time t, about the state of the ¯rm.







11which is a well-de¯ned probability if, and only if, D · C. This implies that he
will only lend to the ¯rm, to help them ¯nance their disclosure policy, if he is
su±ciently well compensated for the likelihood that the ¯rm will default on its
debt obligation if they adopt a very transparent disclosure policy; that is, he
will only lend to the manager if he is prepared to pay a coupon which exceeds
the amount of debt he is given. (Note that this same condition is necessary if,
instead, the lender is assumed to adopt a pro¯t maximising policy.)
4.3 Equilibrium
For a given level of debt, we want to ¯nd a coupon, C¤, such that p¤
d = p¤
l;
that is, the manager's belief threshold about when to disclose is equal to the
lender's belief threshold about when to lend. Equating equations (9) and (11)






















V N¡I+D ¡ 1
(12)
implying that the equilibrium belief threshold for the manager, and indeed the


















The main ¯ndings from an analysis of this equilibrium threshold are given in
Proposition 4, Proposition 5, and Proposition 6 below. The proofs are outlined
in Appendices D, E, and F, respectively.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium belief, p¤¤
d , is a well-de¯ned probability.
Proposition 5. The greater the level of debt obtained, the lower the threshold
above which the manager will disclose, in equilibrium.
This is owing to the fact that, with debt, the manager is likely to prefer
a riskier and more transparent disclosure policy because his downside risk is
limited; that is, the loss he may incur from a negative response reduces with
the level of debt he obtains.
Proposition 6. In equilibrium, the manager will disclose earlier, when some
of the ¯nancing comes from debt, than if all of the disclosure was ¯nanced with
equity; that is p¤¤
d < p¤.
Firstly considering the manager's optimal disclosure policy, we have shown
in Proposition 5 that to the extent that debt reduces the manager's disclo-
sure cost, and that limited liability reduces his downside risk, the disclosure
12threshold is lower. However, on the other hand, to the extent that the lender
anticipates the likelihood that the response to disclosure will be negative, and
thus, the manager defaults on his debt, he demands a coupon that compen-
sates him for this risk. As already pointed out, this coupon, or repayment, is
actually larger than the amount of debt he lends. Thus, the manager's payo®
from disclosure decreases in the coupon payment demanded, as does his belief
threshold in equilibrium, p¤¤
d . Hence, the higher the coupon payment, the later
the manager discloses as he requires greater conviction that a positive response
will ensue. Overall, in equilibrium, we ¯nd, similar to Sabarwal [14], that the
net e®ect of this type of debt-¯nancing is negative; that is, the coupon payment
demanded is not so high that the manager requires even greater conviction be-
fore disclosing that the response will be positive than if all his ¯nancing arose
from equity. Hence, the reduction in the investment cost and the impact of
limited liability appears to be su±cient in encouraging the manager to adopt
a more transparent disclosure policy.
5 Conclusion
This research shows how adopting a real options approach can aid our under-
standing of corporate voluntary disclosure. The concept of a disclosure option
is proposed and in this way the corporate disclosure literature is linked to-
gether with the real options literature. The decision to disclose, or withhold,
information is strategic on the part of the ¯rm. This implies that the manager
will only announce the information if he is su±ciently certain that the market
response to the information will have a positive impact on the value of the
¯rm, and thus, on his own utility from wealth. An analytical expression for
the manager's threshold belief in a positive market response to the disclosed
information is derived and analysed using a real options framework. We show
that the approach taken in this paper demands a higher threshold belief in a
positive market response than under the classical NPV approach.
An extension to the model shows that the Modigliani{Miller theorem of
investment ¯nancing is violated in the instance of corporate disclosure. When
some of the disclosure cost is ¯nanced with debt, the manager adopts a lower
disclosure threshold owing to the limited liability aspect of debt which dom-
inates the loss incurred by the manager through compensating the lender for
expected default losses.
To conclude, there are two points worth noting with regard to relevant is-
sues which are absent in the analysis. The ¯rst is that the market for voluntary
disclosure is assumed to be complete; that is, the payo® to the manager from
making a disclosure voluntarily may be perfectly replicated through trading
with existing marketed securities. However, this assumption is at odds with
reality, and therefore, an examination of the same problem, but under the as-
13sumption of incomplete markets, could have an interesting e®ect on the current
results. The problem in incomplete markets is that there is no unique way to
value the option. A possible way forward here would be to adopt the approach
taken in Thijssen [19]. He views market incompleteness as a case of ambiguity
over the correct way to discount future payo®s. A multiple prior model to-
gether with the assumption of ambiguity aversion leads to a well-de¯ned option
value. In a standard real options setting Thijssen [19] shows that the e®ect of
market incompleteness is not trivial. It is to be expected that similar results
hold in the case of voluntary disclosure. The second aspect worth noting is
that the manager does not face any competitive pressure whilst deciding on an
optimal disclosure policy. Once again, this assumption is an abstraction from
reality, the examination of which ought to be conducted in further research.
Appendix
A Derivation of the Optimal Disclosure Policy
The critical value of the conditional belief in a positive market response to
an announcement, denoted p¤ = p(s¤), is the point such that the manager is
indi®erent between disclosing the information and withholding it. That is, if
pt > p¤, the manager is con¯dent that there will be a positive trading response
to the announcement if disclosed. On the other hand, if pt < p¤, the manager
is not con¯dent enough in a positive response and waits for more information
to arrive.
In order to solve for p¤, the approach taken is to solve the optimal stopping
problem (5) by examining two scenarios. This solution approach is similar
to the approach taken by Jensen [13] and Thijssen et al. [20]. The stopping
value, denoted by U(s) and given by (4), is the expected return to the ¯rm
from disclosing the information to the market immediately. This is the ¯rst
scenario examined. The alternative scenario is that it is optimal not to disclose
immediately, but to wait for more signals to arrive. The value of the option,
known as the continuation value, denoted by C(s), represents the discounted
expected value of the next piece of information.
Since there are no cash-°ows accruing from the disclosure option, C(¢)
should satisfy the Bellman equation over a small interval of time dt, i.e.
C(st) = e
¡rdtEt[C(st+dt)]: (A.1)
This equation says that the value of the option at time t should equal its
discounted expected value at time t + dt, where the time interval dt becomes
in¯nitesimally small. In a small time interval dt, no information is received by
the manager with probability, 1¡¹dt. On the other hand, information arrives
14with probability ¹dt. If information arrives, the value of the option jumps,
either to C(st + 1) if the information is deemed to signal a positive market
reaction, or C(st ¡ 1) otherwise. Assuming that the current number of net
signals is s (and, hence, that the current posterior belief in a positive market
reaction is p(s)), this implies that (A.1) becomes
C(s) =(1 ¡ rdt)
n
(1 ¡ ¹dt)C(s) + ¹dt
h
p(s)[µC(s + 1) + (1 ¡ µ)C(s ¡ 1)]




Substituting for p(s) using (2), dividing by dt and taking the limit dt # 0, we
obtain the following di®erence equation:
^ C(s + 1) ¡
r + ¹
¹
^ C(s) + µ(1 ¡ µ) ^ C(s ¡ 1) = 0; (A.3)
where
^ C(s) := (µ
s + ³(1 ¡ µ)
s)C(s);
Equation (A.3) has a general solution given by





where A1 and A2 are constants and 0 < ¯2 < 1 ¡ µ < µ < ¯1 are the solutions





µs + ³(1 ¡ µ)s;
Imposing several boundary conditions then leads to a solution for the un-
knowns s¤, A1, and A2. First of all, if s ! ¡1, the probability of the posterior
belief ever reaching p¤ goes to zero and, hence, the option becomes worthless.
So, it should hold that lims!¡1 C(s) = 0. Since 0 < ¯2 < 1 ¡ µ this implies
that A2 = 0. A second condition is that the value of the option should be con-
tinuous at s¤. The third boundary condition is another continuity condition
that stems from the realisation that the point s¤ ¡ 1 is special. In deriving
C(¢) it was (implicitly) assumed that after receiving the next signal disclosure
still does not take place. But, for s 2 [s¤ ¡ 1;s¤), the manager knows that
if the next signal indicates a positive market reaction, then disclosure should
take place. Denoting the option value in the range [s¤ ¡ 1;s¤) by CU, it can





[p(s)µ + (1 ¡ p(s))(1 ¡ µ)]U(s + 1)




15So, the value of the disclosure option is
U
¤(s) = 1(s<s¤¡1)C(s) + 1(s¤¡1·s<s¤)CU(s) + 1(s¸s¤)U(s):
This is a free-boundary problem, for which the constant A1 and threshold s¤ can
be found by the continuity conditions C(s¤ ¡ 1) = CU(s¤ ¡ 1) and CU(s¤) =
U(s¤). Solving in terms of p¤ := p(s¤) gives
p
¤ =
µ ¡ 1 + ¯1
1 ¡ µ
·
V P ¡ V N




V P ¡ I






B Proof of Proposition 1
To prove that p¤ is a well-de¯ned probability, we need to establish that 0 <
p¤ · 1. Firstly, ¯1 > 1¡µ ensures that the numerator of (6) is positive. Since,
by assumption, V N < I · V P, pNPV is a well-de¯ned probability. This, added
to the fact that V N < 0, implies that the denominator is also positive and,
hence, p¤ > 0. Secondly, to ensure that p¤







V P ¡ I
V N ¡ I
¶
¸ ¡1;




















This ¯nal inequality is satis¯ed since V P ¸ I and ¯1 > µ.
Let pNPV denote the disclosure threshold under the standard new present
value criterion. Then pNPV is such that at pNPV the bene¯ts from disclosure
are exactly equal to the (sunk) costs incurred. So,
U(pNPV) = 0 () pNPV =
I ¡ V N
V P ¡ V N :
Note that p¤ can be written in terms of pNPV as follows:
p
¤ =








V P ¡ I






Some trivial algebraic manipulation shows that
p







This inequality is satis¯ed since, by assumption, µ > 1
2.
16C Proof of Proposition 3
The expected time between the arrival of two signals is 1
¹ (Dixit and Pindyck
[6]). p¤ denotes the manager's disclosure threshold. Taking implicit derivatives
shows that p¤ decreases in 1
¹:












¡ 4µ(1 ¡ µ)




p¤ is given by equation (6), and a comparative static result on p¤ with











Since V P > I and µ > 1










and hence, p¤ decreases in 1
¹.
D Proof of Proposition 4
It is easily established that p¤¤
d , given by equation (13), is well-de¯ned if, and
only if, C¤ · V P ¡ I + D, where C¤ is given by equation (12).





V N ¡ I + D
¢




V P ¡ I + D
¢
¯1














N ¡ I + D
¢
· 0:
This is satis¯ed since ¯1 > µ > 1
2, implying ¯1 > 1 ¡ µ, and V N ¡ I + D < 0,
by assumption.
17E Proof of Proposition 5
Substituting for C¤ in equation (9) using (12), and taking comparative statics
with respect to D, we ¯nd that the equilibrium belief threshold decreases with



























Since µ > 1
2, by assumption, 1
1¡µ ¡ 1
µ > 0 and ¯1 > µ implying that 1¡
¯1
µ < 0.
Hence the condition given by (E.1) holds, and p¤¤
d is decreasing in debt.
F Proof of Proposition 6
p¤¤
d < p¤ if, and only if,
I ¡ V N
V P ¡ V N <
D
C¤; (F.1)
where C¤ is given by equation (12).
After substituting for C¤, an algebraic manipulation reduces this expression













N ¡ I + D
¢
> 0







< 0. Moreover, V P ¸ I and
(V N ¡ I + D) < 0 which implies that the expression is positive, and that the
condition given by (F.1) holds. Thus, p¤¤
d < p¤.
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